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Abstract—Complex networks usually expose community struc-
ture with groups of nodes sharing many links with the other
nodes in the same group and relatively few with the nodes
of the rest. This feature captures valuable information about
the organization and even the evolution of the network. Over
the last decade, a great number of algorithms for community
detection have been proposed to deal with the increasingly
complex networks. However, the problem of doing this in a
private manner is rarely considered.
In this paper, we solve this problem under differential privacy,
a prominent privacy concept for releasing private data. We ana-
lyze the major challenges behind the problem and propose several
schemes to tackle them from two perspectives: input perturbation
and algorithm perturbation. We choose Louvain method as the
back-end community detection for input perturbation schemes
and propose the method LouvainDP which runs Louvain al-
gorithm on a noisy super-graph. For algorithm perturbation,
we design ModDivisive using exponential mechanism with the
modularity as the score. We have thoroughly evaluated our
techniques on real graphs of different sizes and verified their
outperformance over the state-of-the-art.
I. INTRODUCTION
Graphs represent a rich class of data observed in daily life
where entities are described by nodes and their connections are
characterized by edges. Apart from microscopic (node level)
and macroscopic (graph level) configurations, many complex
networks display a mesoscopic structure, i.e. they appear
as a combination of components fairly independent of each
other. These components are called communities, modules
or clusters and the problem of how to reveal them plays a
significant role in understanding the organization and function
of complex networks. Over the last decade, a great number of
algorithms for community detection (CD) have been proposed
to address the problem in a variety of settings, such as
undirected/directed, unweighted/weighted networks and non-
overlapping/overlapping communities (for a comprehensive
survey, see [13]).
These approaches, however, are adopted in a non-private
manner, i.e. a data collector (such as Facebook) knows all the
contributing users and their relationships before running CD
algorithms. The output of such a CD, in the simplest form,
is a clustering of nodes. Even in this case, i.e. only a node
clustering (not the whole graph) is revealed, contributing users
privacy may still be put at risk.
In this paper, we address the problem of CD from the
perspective of differential privacy [11]. This privacy model
offers a formal definition of privacy with a lot of interesting
properties: no computational/informational assumptions about
attackers, data type-agnosticity, composability and so on [22].
By differential privacy, we want to ensure the existence of
connections between users to be hidden in the output clustering
while keeping the low distortion of clusters compared to the
ones generated by the corresponding non-private algorithms.
As far as we know, the problem is quite new and only
mentioned in the recent work [24] where Mu¨lle et al. use
a sampling technique to perturb the input graph so that it
satisfies differential privacy before running conventional CD
algorithms. This technique (we call it EdgeFlip afterwards) is
classified as input perturbation in differential privacy literature
(the other two categories are algorithm perturbation and
output perturbation). Similarly, TmF approach [26] can apply
to the true graph to get noisy output graphs as in the work
of Mu¨lle et al. Earlier, 1k-Series [34], Density Explore Recon-
struct (DER) [7] and HRG-MCMC [35] are the best known
methods for graph structure release under differential privacy.
These methods can be followed by any exact CD algorithm
to get a noisy clustering satisfying differential privacy. We
choose Louvain method [3] as such a CD algorithm. However,
as we will see in the experiments, the output clusterings by the
aforementioned methods have very low modularity. This fact
necessitates new methods for CD problem under differential
privacy.
Our main contributions are the new schemes LouvainDP
(input perturbation) and ModDivisive (algorithm perturbation)
which perform much better than the state-of-the-art. Lou-
vainDP is a high-pass filtering method that randomly groups
nodes into supernodes of equal size to build a weighted
supergraph. LouvainDP is guaranteed to run in linear time.
ModDivisive is a top-down approach which privately divides
the node set into the k-ary tree guided by the modularity
score at each level. The main technique used in ModDivisive
is the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to realize the
exponential mechanism [21]. We show that ModDivisive’s
runtime is linear in the number of nodes, the height of the
binary tree and the burn-in factor of MCMC. The linear
complexity enables us to examine million-scale graphs in
a few minutes. The experiments show the high modularity
and low distortion of the output clusters by LouvainDP and
ModDivisive.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We analyze the major challenges of community detection
under differential privacy. We explain why techniques
borrowed from k-Means fail and how the difficulty of
ǫ-DP recommender systems justifies a relaxation of ǫ.
• We design an input perturbation scheme LouvainDP that
runs in linear time using the high-pass filtering technique
from [10] and Louvain method [3].
• We propose an algorithm perturbation scheme ModDi-
visive as a divisive approach by using the modularity-
based score function in the exponential mechanism. We
prove that modularity has small global sensitivity and
ModDivisive also runs in linear time.
• We conduct a thorough evaluation on real graphs of dif-
ferent sizes and show the outperformance of LouvainDP
and ModDivisive over the state-of-the-art.
The paper is organized as follows. We review the related
work for community detection algorithms and graph release
via differential privacy in Section II. Section III briefly in-
troduces the key concepts of differential privacy, the popular
Louvain method and the major challenges of ǫ-DP community
detection. Section IV focuses on the category of input pertur-
bation in which we propose LouvainDP and review several
recent input perturbation schemes. We describe ModDivisive
in Section V. We compare all the presented schemes on real
graphs in Section VI. Finally, we present our conclusions and
suggest future work in Section VII.
Table I summarizes the key notations used in this paper.
TABLE I: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G = (V,EG) true graph with n = |V | and m = |EG|
G′ = (V,EG′) neighboring graph of G
G˜ = (V,EG˜) sample noisy output graph
G1 = (V1, E1) supergraph generated by LouvainDP
k fan-out of the tree in ModDivisive
K burn-in factor in MCMC-based algorithms
λ common ratio to distribute the privacy budget
C a clustering of nodes in G
Q(G,C) modularity of the clustering C on graph G
II. RELATED WORK
A. Community Detection in Graphs
There is a vast literature on community detection in graphs.
For a recent comprehensive survey, we refer to [13]. In this
section, we discuss several classes of techniques.
Newman and Girvan [25] propose modularity as a quality of
network clustering. It is based on the idea that a random graph
is not expected to have a modular structure, so the possible
existence of clusters is revealed by the comparison between
the actual density of edges in a subgraph and the density one
would expect to have in the subgraph if the nodes of the graph
were connected randomly (the null model). The modularity Q
is defined as
Q =
nc∑
c=1
[
lc
m
−
(
dc
2m
)2]
(1)
where nc is the number of clusters, lc is the total number of
edges joining nodes in community c and dc is the sum of the
degrees of the nodes of c.
Many methods for optimizing the modularity have been
proposed over the last ten years, such as agglomerative greedy
[9], simulated annealing [23], random walks [28], statistical
mechanics [31], label propagation [30] or InfoMap [32], just
to name a few. The recent multilevel approach, also called
Louvain method, by Blondel et al. [3] is a top performance
scheme. It scales very well to graphs with hundreds of millions
of nodes. This is the chosen method for the input perturbation
schemes considered in this paper (see Sections III-B and IV for
more detail). By maximizing the modularity, Louvain method
is based on edge counting metrics, so it fits well with the
concept of edge differential privacy (Section III-A). One of
the most recent methods SCD [29] is not chosen because it
is about maximizing Weighted Community Clustering (WCC)
instead of the modularity. WCC is based on triangle counting
which has high global sensitivity (up to O(n)) [37]. Moreover,
SCD pre-processes the graph by removing all edges that do not
close any triangle. This means all 1-degree nodes are excluded
and form singleton clusters. The number of output clusters is
empirically up to O(n).
B. Graph Release via Differential Privacy
In principle, after releasing a graph satisfying ǫ-DP, we
can do any mining operations on it, including community
detection. The research community, therefore, expresses a
strong interest in the problem of graph release via differential
privacy. Differentially private algorithms relate the amount of
noise to the computation sensitivity. Lower sensitivity implies
smaller added noise. Because the edges in simple undirected
graphs are usually assumed to be independent, the standard
Laplace mechanism [11] is applicable (e.g. adding Laplace
noise to each cell of the adjacency matrix). However, this
approach severely deteriorates the graph structure.
The state-of-the-art [7], [35] try to reduce the sensitivity
of the graph in different ways. Density Explore Reconstruct
(DER)[7] employs a data-dependent quadtree to summarize
the adjacency matrix into a counting tree and then reconstructs
noisy sample graphs. DER is an instance of input perturbation.
Xiao et al. [35] propose to use Hierarchical Random Graph
(HRG) [8] to encode graph structural information in terms of
edge probabilities. Their scheme HRG-MCMC is argued to be
able to sample good HRG models which reflect the community
structure in the original graph. HRG-MCMC is classified as
an algorithm perturbation scheme. A common disadvantage
of the state-of-the-art DER and HRG-MCMC is the scalability
issue. Both of them incur quadratic complexityO(n2), limiting
themselves to medium-sized graphs.
Recently, Nguyen et al. [26] proposed TmF that utilizes a
filtering technique to keep the runtime linear in the number
of edges. TmF also proves the upper bound O(lnn) for
the privacy budget ǫ. At the same time, Mu¨lle et al. [24]
devised the scheme EdgeFlip using an edge flipping technique.
However, EdgeFlip costs O(n2) and is runnable only on
graphs of tens of thousands of nodes.
A recent paper by Campan et al. [4] studies whether
anonymized social networks preserve existing communities
from the original social networks. The considered anonymiza-
tion methods are SaNGreeA [5] and k-degree method [20].
Both of them use k-anonymity rather than differential privacy
which is the focus of this paper.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review key concepts and mechanisms of
differential privacy.
A. Differential Privacy
Essentially, ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ-DP) [11] is proposed
to quantify the notion of indistinguishability of neighboring
databases. In the context of graph release, two graphs G1 =
(V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) are neighbors if V1 = V2, E1 ⊂
E2 and |E2| = |E1|+1. Note that this notion of neighborhood
is called edge differential privacy in contrast with the notion of
node differential privacy which allows the addition of one node
and its adjacent edges. Node differential privacy has much
higher sensitivity and is much harder to analyze [18], [2]. Our
work follows the common use of edge differential privacy. The
formal definition of ǫ-DP for graph data is as follows.
Definition 3.1: A mechanism A is ǫ-differentially private if
for any two neighboring graphs G1 and G2, and for any output
O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(G1) ∈ O] ≤ eǫPr[A(G2) ∈ O]
Laplace mechanism [11] and Exponential mechanism [22]
are two standard techniques in differential privacy. The latter
is a generalization of the former. Laplace mechanism is based
on the concept of global sensitivity of a function f which
is defined as ∆f = maxG1,G2 ||f(G1) − f(G2)||1 where the
maximum is taken over all pairs of neighboring G1, G2. Given
a function f and a privacy budget ǫ, the noise is drawn from
a Laplace distribution Lap(λ) : p(x|λ) = 12λe−|x|/λ where
λ = ∆f/ǫ.
Theorem 3.1: (Laplace mechanism [11]) For any function
f : G→ Rd, the mechanism A
A(G) = f(G) + 〈Lap1(∆f
ǫ
), ..., Lapd(
∆f
ǫ
)〉 (2)
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, where Lapi(∆fǫ ) are i.i.d
Laplace variables with scale parameter ∆fǫ . 
Geometric mechanism [14] is a discrete variant of Laplace
mechanism with integral output range Z and random noise ∆
generated from a two-sided geometric distribution Geom(α) :
Pr[∆ = δ|α] = 1−α1+αα|δ|. To satisfy ǫ-DP, we set α =
exp(−ǫ). We use geometric mechanism in our LouvainDP
scheme.
For non-numeric data, the exponential mechanism is a better
choice [21]. Its main idea is based on sampling an output
O from the output space O using a score function u. This
function assigns exponentially higher probabilities to outputs
of higher scores. Let the global sensitivity of u be ∆u =
maxO,G1,G2 |u(G1, O)− u(G2, O)|.
Theorem 3.2: (Exponential mechanism [21]) Given a score
function u : (G × O) → R for a graph G, the mechanism
A that samples an output O with probability proportional to
exp( ǫ.u(G,O)2∆u ) satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. 
Fig. 1: Louvain method
Composability is a nice property of differential privacy
which is not satisfied by other privacy models such as k-
anonymity.
Theorem 3.3: (Sequential and parallel compositions [22])
Let each Ai provide ǫi-differential privacy. A sequence of
Ai(D) over the dataset D provides Σni=1ǫi-differential privacy.
Let each Ai provide ǫi-differential privacy. Let Di be
arbitrary disjoint subsets of the dataset D. The sequence of
Ai(Di) provides maxni=1 ǫi-differential privacy. 
B. Louvain Method
Since its introduction in 2008, Louvain method [3] becomes
one of the most cited methods for the community detection
task. It optimizes the modularity by a bottom-up folding
process. The algorithm is divided in passes each of which is
composed of two phases that are repeated iteratively. Initially,
each node is assigned to a different community. So, there
will be as many communities as there are nodes in the first
phase. Then, for each node i, the method considers the gain of
modularity if we move i from its community to the community
of a neighbor j (a local change). The node i is then placed in
the community for which this gain is maximum and positive (if
any), otherwise it stays in its original community. This process
is applied repeatedly and sequentially for all nodes until no
further improvement can be achieved and the first pass is then
complete.
We demonstrate Louvain method in Fig.1 by a graph of
13 nodes and 20 edges. If each node forms its own sin-
gleton community, the modularity Q will be -0.0825. In the
first pass of Louvain method, each node moves to the best
community selected from its neighbors’ communities. We
get the partition [{0, 1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6, 11, 12}, {7, 8, 9, 10}]
with modularity 0.46375. The second phase of first pass
builds a weighted graph corresponding to the partition by
aggregating communities. The second pass repeats the folding
process on this weighted graphs to reach the final parti-
tion [{0, 1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12}, {7, 8, 9, 10}] with modular-
ity 0.47.
This simple agglomerative algorithm has several advantages
as stated in [3]. First, its steps are intuitive and easy to
implement, and the outcome is unsupervised. Second, the
algorithm is extremely fast, i.e. computer simulations on large
modular networks suggest that its complexity is linear on
typical and sparse data. This is due to the fact that the possible
gains in modularity are easy to compute and the number of
communities decreases drastically after just a few passes so
that most of the running time is concentrated on the first
iterations. Third, the multi-level nature of the method produces
a hierarchical structure of communities which allows multi-
resolution analysis, i.e the user can zoom in the graph to
observe its structure with the desired resolution. In addition,
Louvain method is runnable on weighted graphs. This fact
supports naturally our scheme LouvainDP as described in
Section IV-A.
C. Challenges of Community Detection under Differential
Privacy
In this section, we explain why community detection under
differential privacy is challenging. We show how techniques
borrowed from related problems fail. We also advocate the
choice of ǫ as a function of graph size n.
The problem of differentially private community detection is
closely related to ǫ-DP k-Means clustering and recommender
systems. The ǫ-DP k-Means is thoroughly discussed in [33].
However, techniques from ǫ-DP k-Means are not suitable
to ǫ-DP community detection. First, items in k-Means are
in low-dimensional spaces and the number of clusters k is
usually small. This contrast to the case of community detection
where nodes lie in a n-dimensional space and the number
of communities varies from tens to tens of thousands, not
to say the communities may overlap or be nested (multi-
scale). Second, items in ǫ-DP k-Means are normalized to
[−1, 1]d while the same preprocessing seems invalid in ǫ-
DP community detection. Moreover, the output of k-Means
usually consists of equal-sized balls while this is not true
for communities in graphs. Considering the graph as a high-
dimensional dataset, we tried the private projection technique
in [19] which is followed by spectral clustering, but the
modularity scores of the output are not better than random
clustering.
Recent papers on ǫ-DP recommender systems [16], [1]
show that privately learning the clustering of items from user
ratings is hard unless we relax the value of ǫ up to log n.
Banerjee et al. [1] model differentially private mechanisms as
noisy channels and bound the mutual information between the
generative sources and the privatized sketches. They show that
in the information-rich regime (each user rates O(n) items),
their Pairwise-Preference succeeds if the number of users is
Ω(n logn/ǫ). Compared to ǫ-DP community detection where
the number of users is n, we should have ǫ = Ω(logn).
Similarly, in D2P scheme, Guerraoui et al. [16] draw a formula
for ǫ as
ǫ
(p,0,λ)
D2P = ln(1 +
(1− p).NE
p.|Gλ| ) (3)
where λ is the distance used to conceal the user profiles (λ = 0
reduces to the classic notion of differential privacy). NE is the
number of items which is exactly n in community detection.
|Gλ| is the minimum size of user profiles at distance λ over all
users (|Gλ| = o(NE) except at unreasonably large λ). Clearly,
at p = 0.5 (as used in [16]), we have ǫ(0.5,0,λ)D2P ≈ lnn. The
sampling technique in D2P is very similar to EdgeFlip [24]
(a) Input perturbation
(b) Algorithm perturbation
Fig. 2: Two categories of ǫ-DP community detection
which is shown ineffective in ǫ-DP community detection for
ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5 lnn) (Section VI). Note that ǫ-DP community
detection is unique in the sense that the set of items and the
set of users are the same. Graphs for community detection are
more general than bipartite graphs in recommender systems.
In addition, modularity Q (c.f. Formula 1) is non-monotone,
i.e. for two disjoint sets of nodes A and B, Q(A ∪ B) may
be larger, smaller than or equal to Q(A) +Q(B).
To further emphasize the difficulty of ǫ-DP community
detection, we found that IDC scheme [17] using Sparse Vector
Technique [12, Section 3.6] is hardly feasible. As shown
in Algorithm 1 of [17], to publish a noisy graph that can
approximately answer all cut queries with bounded error
m0.25n/ǫ0.5, IDC must have B(α) “yes” queries among all
k queries. B(α) may be as low as
√
m but k = 22n. In the
average case, IDC incurs exponential time to complete.
To conclude, ǫ-DP community detection is challenging
and requires new techniques. In this paper, we evaluate the
schemes for ǫ up to 0.5 lnn. At ǫ = 0.5 lnn, the multi-
plicative ratio (c.f. Definition 3.1) is eǫ = e0.5 lnn = √n,
a reasonable threshold for privacy protection compared to
ǫ = lnn (i.e. eǫ = n) in ǫ-DP recommender systems discussed
above. The typical epsilon in the literature is 1.0 or less.
However, this value is only applicable to graph metrics of
low sensitivity O(1) such as the number of edges, the degree
sequence. The global sensitivity of other metrics like the
diameter, the number of triangles, 2K-series etc. is O(n),
calling for local sensitivity analysis (e.g. [27]). For counting
queries, Laplace/Geometric mechanisms are straightforward
on real/integral (metric) spaces. However, direct noise adding
mechanisms on the space P of all ways to partition the nodeset
V are non-trivial because |P| ≈ nn and P is non-metric. That
is another justification for the relaxation of ǫ up to 0.5 lnn.
IV. INPUT PERTURBATION
In this section, we propose the linear scheme LouvainDP
that uses a filtering technique to build a noisy weighted
supergraph and calls the exact Louvain method subsequently.
Then we discuss several recent ǫ-DP schemes that can be
classified as input perturbation. Fig.2a sketches the basic steps
of the input perturbation paradigm.
A. LouvainDP: Louvain Method on Noisy Supergraphs
The basic idea of LouvainDP is to create a noisy weighted
supergraph G1 from G by grouping nodes into supernodes of
equal size k. We then apply the filtering technique of Cormode
et al. [10] to ensure only O(m) noisy weighted edges in G1.
Finally, we run the exact community detection on G1.
In [10], Cormode et al. propose several summarization
techniques for sparse data under differential privacy. Let M
be a contingency table having the domain size m0 and m1
non-zero entries (m1 ≪ m0 for sparse data), the conventional
publication of a noisy table M ′ from M that satisfies ǫ-
DP requires the addition of Laplace/geometric noise to m0
entries. The entries in M ′ could be filtered (e.g. removing
negative ones) and/or sampled to get a noisy summary M ′′.
This direct approach would be infeasible for huge domain
sizes m0. Techniques in [10] avoid materializing the vast noisy
data by computing the summary M ′′ directly from M using
filtering and sampling techniques.
In our LouvainDP, the supergraph G1 is an instance of
sparse data with the domain size m0 = n1(n1+1)2 where
n1 is the number of supernodes and m1 non-zero entries
corresponding to non-zero superedges. We use the one-sided
filtering [10] to efficiently compute G1 with O(m) edges in
linear time.
1) Algorithm: LouvainDP can run with either geometric or
Laplace noise. We describe the version with geometric noise
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 LouvainDP(G, s)
Input: undirected graph G, group size k, privacy budget ǫ
Output: noisy partition C˜
1: G1 ← ∅, n1 = ⌊ |V |k ⌋ − 1, V1 ← {0, 1, .., n1}
2: ǫ2 = 0.1, ǫ1 = ǫ− ǫ2, α = exp(−ǫ1)
3: get a random permutation Vp of V
4: compute the mapping M : Vp → V1
5: compute superedges of G1: E1 = {e1(i, j)} where i, j ∈ V1
6: m1 = |E1|+ Lap(1/ǫ2), m0 = n1(n1+1)2
7: θ = ⌈logα
(1+α)m1
m0−m1
⌉
8: s = (m0 −m1) α
θ
1+α
9: for e1(i, j) in E1 do
10: e1(i, j) = e1(i, j) +Geom(α)
11: if e1(i, j) ≥ θ then
12: add e1(i, j) to G1
13: for s edges sampled uniformly at random e1(i, j) /∈ E1 do
14: draw w from the distribution Pr[X ≤ x] = 1− αx−θ+1
15: if w > 0 then
16: add edge e1(i, j) with weight w to G1
17: run Louvain method on G1 to get C˜1
18: compute C˜ from C˜1 using the mapping M
19: return C˜
Given the group size k, LouvainDP starts with a supergraph
G1 having ⌊ |V |k ⌋ nodes by randomly permuting the nodeset
V and grouping every k consecutive nodes into a supernode
(lines 1-4). The permutation prevents the possible bias of node
ordering in G. The set of superedges E1 is easily computed
from G. Note that m1 = |E1| ≤ m due to the fact that each
edge of G appears in one and only one superedge. The domain
size is m0 = n1(n1+1)2 (i.e. we consider all selfloops in G1).
The noisy number of non-zero superedges is m1 = |E1| +
Lap(1/ǫ2). Then by one-sided filtering [10], we estimate the
threshold θ (line 7) and the number of passing zero superedges
s (line 8). For each non-zero superedge, we add a geometric
noise and add the superedge to G1 if the noisy value is not
smaller than θ. For s zero superedges e1(i, j) /∈ E1, we draw
an integral weight w from the distribution Pr[X ≤ x] =
1− αx−θ+1 and add e1(i, j) with weight w to G1 if w > 0.
2) Complexity: LouvainDP runs in O(m) because the loops
to compute superedges (Line 5) and to add geometric noises
(lines 9-12) cost O(m). We have s = (m0 − m1) αθ1+α ≤
m0−m1
1+α
(1+α)m1
m0−m1
= m1 (see Line 7). So the processing of s
zero-superedges costs O(m). Moreover, Louvain method (line
17) is empirically linear in m1 [3]. We come up with the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: The number of edges in G1 is not larger than
2m. LouvainDP’s runtime is O(m)
3) Privacy Analysis: In LouvainDP, we use a small privacy
budget ǫ2 = 0.01 to compute the noisy number of non-
zero superedges m1. The remaining privacy budget ǫ1 is used
for the geometric mechanism Geom(α). Note that getting a
random permutation Vp (line 3) costs no privacy budget. The
number of nodes n is public and given the group size k, the
number of supernodes n1 is also public. The high-pass filtering
technique (Lines 6-16) inherits the privacy guarantee by [10].
By setting ǫ1 = ǫ − ǫ2, LouvainDP satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy (see the sequential composition (Theorem 3.3)).
B. Alternative Input Perturbation Schemes
1K-series [34], DER [7], TmF [26] and EdgeFlip [24]
are the most recent differentially private schemes for graph
release that can be classified as input perturbation. While 1K-
series and TmF run in linear time, DER and EdgeFlip incur a
quadratic complexity. DER and EdgeFlip are therefore tested
only on two medium-sized graphs in Section VI.
The expected number of edges by EdgeFlip is |EG˜| =
(1 − s)m + n(n−1)4 s (see [24]) where s = 2eǫ+1 is the
flipping probability. Substitute s into |EG˜|, we get |EG˜| =
m + (n(n−1)4 − m) 2eǫ+1 . The number of edges in the noisy
graph G˜ generated by EdgeFlip increases exponentially as ǫ
decreases. To ensure the linear complexity for million-scale
graphs, we propose a simple extension of EdgeFlip, called
EdgeFlipShrink (Algorithm 2).
Instead of outputting G˜, EdgeFlipShrink computes Gˆ that
has the expected number of edges m by shrinking EG˜. First,
the algorithm compute the private number of edges m˜ using
a small budget ǫ2 (Lines 2-3 ). The new flipping probability
s˜ is updated (Line 5). The noisy expected number of edges
in the original EdgeFlip is shown in Line 6. We obtain the
shrinking factor p = m˜m0 (Line 7). Using p, every 1-edge is
sampled with probability 1−s˜2 p instead of
1−s
2 as in [24]. The
remaining 0-edges are randomly picked from EG as long as
they do not exist in Gˆ (Lines 14-19).
The expected edges of Gˆ is E[Gˆ] = E[m˜] = m and the
running time of EdgeFlipShrink is O(m).
Algorithm 2 EdgeFlipShrink(G, s)
Input: undirected graph G, flipping probability s
Output: anonymized graph Gˆ
1: Gˆ← ∅
2: ǫ2 = 0.1
3: m˜ = m+ Lap(1/ǫ2)
4: ǫ = ln( 2
s
− 1)− ǫ2
5: s˜ = 2
eǫ+1
6: m0 = (1− s˜)m˜+ n(n−1)4 s˜
7: p = m˜
m0
8: // process 1-edges
9: n1 = 0
10: for edge (i, j) ∈ EG do
11: add edge (i, j) to Gˆ with prob. 1−s˜
2
p
12: n1 ++
13: // process 0-edges
14: n0 = m˜− n1
15: while n0 > 0 do
16: random pick an edge (i, j) /∈ EG
17: if Gˆ does not contain (i, j) then
18: add edge (i, j) to Gˆ
19: n0- -
20: return Gˆ′
V. ALGORITHM PERTURBATION
The schemes in the algorithm perturbation category pri-
vately sample a node clustering from the input graph without
generating noisy sample graphs as in the input perturbation.
This can be done via the exponential mechanism. We introduce
our main scheme ModDivisive in Section V-A followed by
a variant of HRG-MCMC runnable on large graphs (Section
V-B). Fig.2b sketches the basic steps of the algorithm pertur-
bation paradigm.
A. ModDivisive: Top-down Exploration of Cohesive Groups
1) Overview: In contrast with the agglomerative ap-
proaches (e.g. Louvain method) in which small communities
are iteratively merged if doing so increases the modularity, our
ModDivisive is a divisive algorithm in which communities at
each level are iteratively split into smaller ones. Our goal is
to heuristically detect cohesive groups of nodes in a private
manner. There are several technical challenges in this process.
The first one is how to efficiently find a good split of nodes
that induces a high modularity and satisfies ǫ-DP at the same
time. The second one is how to merge the small groups to
larger ones. We cope with the first challenge by realizing an
exponential mechanism via MCMC (Markov Chain Monte-
Carlo) sampling with the modularity as the score function (see
Theorem 3.2). The second challenge is solved by dynamic
programming. We design ModDivisive as a k-ary tree (Fig.3),
i.e. each internal node has no more than k child nodes.
The root node (level 0) contains all nodes in V and assigns
arbitrarily each node into one of the k groups. Then we run
the MCMC over the space of all partitions of V into no more
than k nonempty subsets. The resultant subsets are initialized
as the child nodes (level 1) of the root. The process is repeated
iteratively for each child node at level 1 and stops at level
Fig. 3: Example of ModDivisive with k = 3. A cut C is shown
by the dot-dashed line
maxL. Fig.3 illustrates the idea with k = 3 for the graph in
Fig.1.
2) Algorithm: Algorithm 3 sketches the main steps in our
scheme ModDivisive. It comprises two phases: differentially
private sampling a k-ary tree of depth maxL which uses the
privacy budget ǫ1 and finding the best cut across the tree
to get a good clustering of nodes which consumes a budget
maxL.ǫm.
The first phase (lines 1-14) begins with the creation of eA,
the array of privacy budgets allocated to levels of the tree.
We use the parameter λ ≥ 1 as the common ratio to form a
geometric sequence. The rationale behind the common ratio
is to give higher priority to the levels near the root which
have larger node sets. By sequential composition (Theorem
3.3), we must have ∑i eA[i] = ǫ1. All internal nodes at level
i do the MCMC sampling on disjoint subsets of nodes, so
the parallel composition holds. Subsection V-A4 analyzes the
privacy of ModDivisive in more detail. We use a queue to
do a level-by-level exploration. Each dequeued node r’s level
will be checked. If its level is not larger than maxL, we will
run ModMCMC (Algorithm 4) on it (line 9) to get a partition
r.part of its nodeset r.S (Fig.3). Each subset in r.part forms
a child node and is pushed to the queue. The second phase
(line 15) calls Algorithm 5 to find a highly modular partition
across the tree.
Algorithm 3 ModDivisive
Input: graph G, group size k, privacy budget ǫ, max level maxL,
ratio λ, BestCut privacy at each level ǫm
Output: noisy partition C˜
1: compute the array eA[0..maxL−1] s.t.
∑
i
eA[i] = ǫ1, eA[i] =
eA[i+ 1] ∗ λ where ǫ1 = ǫ−maxL.ǫm
2: initialize the root node with nodeset V
3: root = NodeSet(G,V, k)
4: root.level = 0
5: queue Q← root
6: while Q is not empty do
7: r ← Q.dequeue()
8: if r.level < maxL then
9: r.part = ModMCMC(G, r.S, k, eA[r.level])
10: for subset Si in r.part do
11: Pi = NodeSet(G,Si, k)
12: Pi.level = r.level + 1
13: r.childi ← Pi
14: Q.enqueue(Pi)
15: C˜ ← BestCut(root, ǫm)
16: return C˜
Differentially Private Nodeset Partitioning Let P be the
space of all ways P to partition a nodeset A to no more
than k disjoint subsets, the direct application of exponential
mechanism needs the enumeration of P . The probability of a
partition P being sampled is
exp(
ǫp
2∆QQ(P,G))∑
P ′∈P exp(
ǫp
2∆QQ(P
′, G))
(4)
However, |P| =∑ki=1 S(|A|, i) where S(|A|, i) is the Stirling
number of the second kind [15], S(n, k) ≈ knk! . This sum is
exponential in |A|, so enumerating P is computationally infea-
sible. Fortunately, MCMC can help us simulate the exponential
mechanism by a sequence of local transitions in P .
The space P is connected. It is straightforward to verify
that the transitions performed in line 3 of ModMCMC are
reversible and ergodic (i.e. any pair of nodeset partitions
can be connected by a sequence of such transitions). Hence,
ModMCMC has a unique stationary distribution in equilib-
rium. By empirical evaluation, we observe that ModMCMC
converges after K|r.S| steps for K = 50 (see Section VI-C).
Each node r in the tree is of type NodeSet. This struct
consists of an array r.part where r.part[u] ∈ {0..k − 1}
is the group id of u. To make sure that ModMCMC runs
in linear time, we must have a constant time computation of
modularity Q(P ) (line 4 of Algorithm 4). This can be done
with two helper arrays: the number of intra-edges r.lc[0..k−1]
and the total degree of nodes r.dc[0..k − 1] in each group.
The modularity Q is computed in O(k) (Formula 1) using
r.lc, r.dc. When moving node u from group i to group j, r.lc
and r.dc are updated accordingly by checking the neighbors
of u in G. The average degree is a constant, so the complexity
of ModMCMC is linear in the number of MCMC steps.
Algorithm 4 ModMCMC
Input: graph G, nodeset r.S, group size k, privacy budget ǫp
Output: sampled partition r.part
1: initialize r.part with a random partition P0 of k groups
2: for each step i in the Markov chain do
3: pick a neighboring partition P ′ of Pi−1 by randomly select-
ing node u ∈ r.S and moving u to another group.
4: accept the transition and set Pi = P ′ with probability
min(1,
exp(
ǫp
2∆Q
Q(P ′,G))
exp(
ǫp
2∆Q
Q(Pi−1,G))
)
5: // until equilibrium is reached
6: return a sampled partition r.part = Pi
Finding the Best Cut Given the output k-ary tree R with
the root node root, our next step is to find the best cut
across the tree. A cut C is a set of nodes in R that cover
all nodes in V . As an example, a cut C in Fig.3 returns the
clustering [{0,1,2,3}, {4}, {5,6,11}, {8,9,10,7,12}]. Any cut
has a modularity score. Our goal is to find the best cut, i.e.
the cut with highest modularity, in a private manner.
We solve this problem by a dynamic programming tech-
nique. Remember that modularity is an additive quantity (c.f.
Formula 1). By denoting opt(r) as the optimal modularity for
the subtree rooted at node r, the optimal value is opt(root).
The recurrence relation is straightforward
opt(r) = max{Q(r),
∑
t∈r.children
opt(t)}
Algorithm 5 realizes this idea in three steps. The first step
(lines 1-6) uses a queue to fill a stack S. The stack ensures
any internal node to be considered after its child nodes. The
second step (lines 7-17) solves the recurrence relation. Because
all modularity values are sensitive, we add Laplace noise
Laplace(∆Q/ǫm). The global sensitivity ∆Q = 3/m (see
Theorem 5.2), so we need only a small privacy budget for
each level (ǫm = 0.01 is enough in our experiments). The
noisy modularity modn is used to decide whether the optimal
modularity at node r is by itself or by the sum over its children.
The final step (lines 18-25) backtracks the best cut from the
root node.
Algorithm 5 BestCut
Input: undirected graph G, root node root, privacy budget at each
level ǫm
Output: best cut C
1: stack S ← ∅, queue Q← root
2: while Q is not empty do
3: r ← Q.dequeue()
4: S.push(r)
5: for child node ri in r.children do
6: Q.enqueue(ri)
7: dictionary sol← ∅
8: while S is not empty do
9: r ← S.pop(), r.modn = r.mod+ Laplace(∆Q/ǫm)
10: if r is a leaf node then
11: sol.put(r.id, (val = r.modn, self = True))
12: else
13: sm =
∑
ri∈r.children
sol[ri.id].modn
14: if r.modn < sm then
15: sol.put(r.id, (val = sm, self = False))
16: else
17: sol.put(r.id, (val = r.modn, self = True))
18: list C ← ∅, queue Q← root
19: while Q is not empty do
20: r ← Q.dequeue()
21: if sol[r.id].self == True then
22: C = C ∪ {r}
23: else
24: for child node ri in r.children do
25: Q.enqueue(ri)
return C
3) Complexity: ModDivisive creates a k-ary tree of height
maxL. At each node r of the tree other than the leaf nodes,
ModMCMC is run once. The run time of ModMCMC is
O(K ∗|r.S|) thanks to the constant time for updating the mod-
ularity (line 4 of ModMCMC). Because the union of nodesets
at one level is V , the total runtime is O(K ∗ |V | ∗ maxL).
BestCut only incurs a sublinear runtime because the size of
tree is always much smaller than |V |. The following theorem
states this result
Theorem 5.1: The time complexity of ModDivisive is linear
in the number of nodes n, the maximum level maxL and the
burn-in factor K .
4) Privacy Analysis: We show that ModMCMC satisfies
differential privacy. The goal of MCMC is to draw a random
sample from the desired distribution. Similarly, exponential
mechanism is also a method to sample an output x ∈ X
from the target distribution with probability proportional to
exp( ǫu(x)2∆u ) where u(x) is the score function (x with higher
score has bigger chance to be sampled) and ∆u is its
sensitivity. The idea of using MCMC to realize exponential
mechanism is first proposed in [6] and applied to ǫ-DP graph
release in [35].
In our ModMCMC, the modularity Q(P,G) is used directly
as the score function. We need to quantify the global sensitivity
of Q. From Section III-A, we have the following definition
Definition 5.1: (Global Sensitivity ∆Q)
∆Q = max
P,G,G′
|Q(P,G)−Q(P,G′)| (5)
We prove that ∆Q = O(1/m) in the following theorem
Theorem 5.2: The global sensitivity of modularity, ∆Q, is
smaller than 3m
Proof: Given the graph G and a partition P of a nodeset
Vp ⊆ V (for any node of the k-ary tree other than the root
node, its nodeset Vp is a strict subset of V ), the neighboring
graph G′ has EG′ = EG ∪ e. We have two cases
Case 1. The new edge e is an intra-edge within the commu-
nity s. The modularity Q(P,G) is
∑k
c (
lc
m − d
2
c
4m2 ). The modu-
larity Q(P,G′) is
∑k
c 6=s(
lc
m+1− d
2
c
4(m+1)2 )+(
ls+1
m+1− (ds+2)
2
4(m+1)2 ).
The difference d1 = Q(P,G′) − Q(P,G) = 1m+1 −
1
m(m+1)
∑k
c lc +
2m+1
4m2(m+1)2
∑k
c d
2
c − ds+1(m+1)2
Because ∆Q is the absolute value of d1, we consider the
most positive and the most negative values of d1. Remember
that
∑k
c dc ≤ 2m, so the positive bound d1 < 1m+1 +
(2m+1)4m2
4m2(m+1)2 <
3
m+1 . For the negative bound, we use the con-
straints
∑k
c lc ≤ m and ds ≤ 2m, so d1 > 1m+1 − mm(m+1) −
2m+1
(m+1)2 >
−2
m+1 . As a result, ∆Q = |d1| < 3m+1 < 3m .
Case 2. The new edge e is an inter-edge between the
communities s and t. Similarly, we have Q(P,G) =
∑k
c (
lc
m−
d2c
4m2 ) while Q(P,G
′) =
∑k
c 6=s,t(
lc
m+1 − d
2
c
4(m+1)2 ) + (
ls
m+1 −
(ds+1)
2
4(m+1)2 ) + (
lt
m+1 − (dt+1)
2
4(m+1)2 ).
The difference d2 = Q(P,G′) − Q(P,G) =
− 1m(m+1)
∑k
c lc +
2m+1
4m2(m+1)2
∑k
c d
2
c − 2ds+2dt+24(m+1)2 . Again,
we consider the most positive and the most negative values
of d2, using the constraint
∑k
c dc ≤ 2m, the positive
bound d2 < (2m+1)4m
2
4m2(m+1)2 <
2
m+1 . For the negative bound,
we use the constraints
∑k
c lc ≤ m and ds + dt ≤ 2m,
so d2 > − mm(m+1) − 4m+24(m+1)2 > −2m+1 . As a result,
∆Q = |d2| < 2m+1 < 2m .
To recap, in both cases ∆Q < 3m .
B. A Variant of HRG-MCMC
Similar to DER and EdgeFlip, HRG-MCMC [35] runs in
quadratic time due to its costly MCMC steps. Each MCMC
Fig. 4: HRG-Fixed
step in HRG-MCMC takes O(n) to update the tree. To make it
runnable on million-scale graphs, we describe briefly a variant
of HRG-MCMC called HRG-Fixed (see Fig.4). Instead of
exploring the whole space of HRG trees as in HRG-MCMC,
HRG-Fixed selects a fixed binary tree beforehand. We choose
a balanced tree in our HRG-Fixed. Then HRG-Fixed realizes
the exponential mechanism by sampling a permutation of n
leaf nodes (note that each leaf node represents a graph node).
The next permutation is constructed from the current one by
randomly choosing a pair of nodes and swap them. The bottom
of Fig.4 illustrates the swap of two nodes a and d. The log-
likelihood L still has the sensitivity ∆L = 2 lnn as in HRG-
MCMC [35]. Each sampling (MCMC) operation is designed
to run in O(d¯. logn). By running K.n MCMC steps, the total
runtime of HRG-Fixed is O(K.m. log n), feasible on large
graphs. The burn-in factor K of HRG-Fixed is set to 1,000 in
our evaluation.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, our evaluation aims to compare the perfor-
mance of the competitors by clustering quality and efficiency.
The clustering quality is measured by the modularity Q and
the average F1-score in which the modularity is the most
important metric as we aim at highly modular clusterings. The
efficiency is measured by the running time. All algorithms are
implemented in Java and run on a desktop PC with Intelr
Core i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
Two medium-sized and three large real graphs are used
in our experiments 1. as20graph is the graph of routers
comprising the internet. ca-AstroPh and dblp are co-
authorship networks where two authors are connected if they
publish at least one paper together. amazon is a product co-
purchasing network where the graph contains an undirected
edge from i to j if a product i is frequently co-purchased
with product j. youtube is a video-sharing web site that
includes a social network. Table II shows the characteristics
of the graphs. The columns Com(munities) and Mod(ularity)
are the output of Louvain method. The number of samples in
each test case is 20.
The schemes are abbreviated as 1K-series (1K), EdgeFlip
(EF), Top-m-Filter (TmF), DER, LouvainDP (LDP), ModDi-
visive (MD), HRG-MCMC and HRG-Fixed.
1http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
TABLE II: Characteristics of the test graphs
Nodes Edges Com Mod
as20graph 6,474 12,572 30 0.623
ca-AstroPh 17,903 196,972 37 0.624
amazon 334,863 925,872 257 0.926
dblp 317,080 1,049,866 375 0.818
youtube 1,134,890 2,987,624 13,485 0.710
A. Quality Metrics
Apart from modularity Q, we use F¯1, the average F1-score,
following the benchmarks in [36]. The F1 score of a set A
with respect to a set B is defined as the harmonic mean H
of the precision and the recall of A against B. We define
prec(A,B) = |A∩B||A| , recall(A,B) =
|A∩B|
|B|
F1(A,B) =
2.prec(A,B).recall(A,B)
prec(A,B) + recall(A,B)
Then the average F1 score of two sets of communities C
and C′ is defined as
F1(A,C) = max
i
F1(A, ci), ci ∈ C = {c1, .., cn}
F¯1(C,C
′) =
1
2|C|
∑
ci∈C
F1(ci, C
′) +
1
2|C′|
∑
ci∈C′
F1(ci, C)
We choose the output clustering of Louvain method as
the ground truth for two reasons. First, the evaluation on
the real ground truth is already done in [29] and Lou-
vain method is proven to provide high quality commu-
nities. Second, the real ground truth is a set of over-
lap communities whereas the schemes in this paper output
only non-overlap communities. The chosen values of ǫ are
{0.1lnn,0.2lnn,0.3lnn,0.4lnn,0.5lnn}.
B. Performance of LouvainDP
We test LouvainDP for the group size k ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32, 64}.
The results on youtube are displayed in Fig. 5. We observe a
clear separation of two groups k = 4, 8 and k = 16, 32, 64. As
k increases, the modularity increases faster but also saturates
sooner. Similar separations appear in avg.F1Score and the
number of communities. Non-trivial modularity scores in
several settings of (k, ǫ) indicate that randomly grouping of
nodes and high-pass filtering superedges do not destroy all
community structure of the original graph.
At ǫ = 0.5 lnn and k = 4, 8, the total edge weight in
G1 is very low ( < 0.05m), so many supernodes of G1 are
disconnected and Louvain method outputs a large number of
communities (Fig. 5c). The reason is that the threshold θ in
LouvainDP is an integral value, so causing abnormal leaps
in the total edge weight of G1. We pick k = 8, 64 for the
comparative evaluation (Section VI-D).
C. Performance of ModDivisive
The effectiveness of ModDivisive is illustrated in Fig. 6 for
graph youtube and λ = 2.0, K = 50. We select six pairs of
(k,maxL) by the set {(2,10),(3,7),(4,5), (5,4),(6,4),(10,3)}.
Modularity increases steadily with ǫ while it is not always
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Fig. 7: ModDivisive: modularity vs. λ and K on amazon
the case for avg.F1Score. The number of communities in the
best cut is shown in Fig. 6c. Clearly, the small number of
communities indicates that ModDivisive’s best cut is not far
from the root. The reason is the use of λ = 2.0, i.e. half
of privacy budget is reserved to the first level, the half of
the rest for the second level and so on. Lower levels receive
geometrically smaller privacy budgets, so their partitions get
poorer results.
We choose λ = 2.0 to obtain a good allocation of ǫ among
the levels. Fig. 7a shows the modularity for different values of
λ. Note that λ = 1.0 means ǫ is equally allocated to the maxL
levels. By building a k-ary tree, we reduce considerably the
size of the state space P for MCMC. As a result, we need
only a small burn-in factor K . Looking at Fig. 7b, we see that
larger K = 100 results in only tiny increase of modularity in
comparison with that of K = 50.
D. Comparative Evaluation
In this section, we report a comparative evaluation of Lou-
vainDP and ModDivisive against the competitors in Figures 9,
10, 11, 12 and 13. The dashed lines in subfigures 9c, 10c, 11c,
12c and 13c represent the ground-truth number of communities
by Louvain method. ModDivisive performs best in most of the
cases.
On as20graph and ca-AstroPh, HRG-MCMC outputs
the whole nodeset V with the zero modularity while 1K-
series, TmF, DER also give useless clusterings. EdgeFlip
produces good quality metrics exclusively on ca-AstroPh
while LouvainDP returns the highest modularity scores on
as20graph. However, the inherent quadratic complexity of
EdgeFlip makes Louvain method fail at ǫ = 0.1 lnn and
0.2 lnn for ca-AstroPh graph.
On the three large graphs, ModDivisive dominates the other
schemes by a large margin in modularity and avg.F1Score.
LouvainDP is the second best in modularity at k = 64.
Our proposed HRG-Fixed is consistent with ǫ and has good
performance on dblp and youtube. Note that HRG-MCMC
is infeasible on the three large graphs due to its quadratic
complexity. Again, 1K-series, TmF and EdgeFlipShrink pro-
vide the worst quality scores with the exception of 1K-series’s
avg.F1Score on youtube.
The runtime of the linear schemes is reported in Fig.
8. EdgeFlipShrink, 1K-series, TmF and LouvainDP benefit
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Fig. 8: Runtime
greatly by running Louvain method on the noisy output graph
G˜. ModDivisive and HRG-Fixed also finish their work quickly
in O(K.n.maxL) and O(K.m. log n) respectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have given a big picture of the problem ǫ-DP com-
munity detection within the two categories: input and al-
gorithm perturbation. We analyzed the major challenges of
community detection under differential privacy. We explained
why techniques borrowed from k-Means fail and how the
difficulty of ǫ-DP recommender systems enables a relaxation
of privacy budget. We proposed LouvainDP and ModDivisive
as the representatives of input and algorithm perturbations
respectively. By conducting a comprehensive evaluation, we
revealed the advantages of our methods. ModDivisive steadily
gives the best modularity and avg.F1Score on large graphs
while LouvainDP outperforms the remaining input perturba-
tion competitors in certain settings. HRG-MCMC/HRG-Fixed
give low modularity clusterings, indicating the limitation of the
HRG model in divisive CD. The input perturbation schemes
DER, EF, 1K-series and TmF hardly deliver any good node
clustering except EF on the two medium-sized graphs.
For future work, we plan to develop an ǫ-DP agglomerative
scheme based on Louvain method and extend our work for
directed graphs and overlapping community detection under
differential privacy.
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Fig. 9: Quality metrics and the number of communities (as20graph) (0.5lnn = 4.4)
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Fig. 10: Quality metrics and the number of communities (ca-AstroPh) (0.5lnn = 4.9)
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Fig. 11: Quality metrics and the number of communities (amazon) (0.5lnn = 6.4)
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Fig. 12: Quality metrics and the number of communities (dblp) (0.5lnn = 6.3)
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Fig. 13: Quality metrics and the number of communities (youtube) (0.5lnn = 7.0)
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